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THESIS

**PEACEKEEPING AND THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
SOUTHERN CONE: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS**

by

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CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS**

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ABSTRACT

Heavy involvement in international peacekeeping has put a drain on U.S. and U.N. resources and the future ability to field effective U.N. peacekeeping forces is questionable. If Latin American countries were able to support future peacekeeping operations in their region, as they do internationally, this would provide relief to the United Nations and the United States. The purpose of this thesis is to determine what factors influence nations to participate in international peacekeeping and to predict whether participation in international peacekeeping will translate into successful regional peacekeeping. This thesis examines the involvement of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). The thesis begins with a theoretical framework for analyzing peacekeeping participation using three major factors that affect the likelihood of a country's involvement in peacekeeping: 1) civil-military relations, 2) foreign policy objectives, and 3) military budget and missions. Ultimately the thesis provides a model to predict which nations are likely to participate in international and regional peacekeeping missions in the future. The conclusions of this thesis will be valuable to policy makers forecasting and determining the likely composition of a future peacekeeping force in Latin America.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	FRAMEWORK.....	1
B.	FACTORS IN PEACEKEEPING POLICY	3
1.	Civil-Military Relations	3
2.	Civilian Preferences.....	4
3.	Military Preferences	5
4.	Regional Peacekeeping Factors	6
II.	ARGENTINA	11
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	11
B.	PATTERNS OF PEACEKEEPING.....	11
C.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS	14
D.	CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PREFERENCES	16
E.	FOREIGN POLICY	16
F.	ECONOMIC POLICY	17
G.	MILITARY BUDGET AND MISSIONS.....	18
H.	CONCLUSION	20
III.	BRAZIL	21
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	21
B.	PATTERNS OF PEACEKEEPING.....	21
C.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS	22
D.	CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PREFERENCES	24
E.	FOREIGN POLICY	24
1.	Non-intervention	26
2.	World Power Aspirations	27
F.	ECONOMIC POLICY	30
G.	MILITARY BUDGET AND MISSIONS.....	31
H.	CONCLUSION	33
IV.	CHILE.....	35
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	35
B.	PATTERNS OF PEACEKEEPING.....	35
C.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS	37
D.	CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PREFERENCES	39
E.	FOREIGN POLICY	40
F.	ECONOMIC POLICY	42
G.	MILITARY BUDGET AND MISSIONS.....	43
H.	CONCLUSION	45
V.	REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	47
A.	OPERATIONAL FUNDING.....	47

B.	REGIONAL HEGEMON	48
C.	HIGHER STAKES OF THE PARTICIPANT NATIONS	48
D.	CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING.....	49
1.	Argentina	49
2.	Brazil	49
3.	Chile.....	50
4.	Conclusion	50
E.	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US POLICY.....	51
LIST OF REFERENCES		53
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		59

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the past decade, the United Nations has been heavily involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations throughout the world. This heavy involvement has put a drain on U.N. resources and the future ability of the U.N. to field peacekeeping forces is at risk. At the same time, U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan has called on regional organizations to increase their share of the burden in global peacekeeping. His basic premise is that regional organizations should take primary responsibility for operations within their spheres of influence. In the event of a peacekeeping intervention in Latin America it is safe to assume, based on historical precedent, that the U.N. might be expected to provide the majority of the resources in a multilateral operation. Recent examples, however, show a capacity and willingness of certain Latin American governments to provide both personnel and leadership to multilateral military operations. If Latin American countries are in fact willing and able to provide the bulk of the forces for humanitarian interventions in the region, this would provide relief to the United Nations, and the United States, both of which will most likely already be burdened with humanitarian and peacekeeping commitments in other parts of the world.

This thesis examines the involvement of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in peacekeeping operations both during the Cold War and in its aftermath. These nations are important to any future peacekeeping operation in Latin America because they are among the most capable armed forces in the region. Additionally, Argentina has been the most active Latin American country in international military operations in recent years. While Brazil has maintained a medium level of activity in (PKOs), it has experience in leading peacekeeping operations. Chile for its part has been traditionally reluctant to participate in PKOs on as large a scale as its neighbors, but with its well-funded and well-manned armed forces and increasing international pressure to take part in PKOs, it may become more of a factor in the future.

The thesis will comprise five chapters beginning with a framework for examining factors that might affect each country's decision to take part in international peacekeeping operations. Specifically, I hypothesize that three major factors affect the likelihood of a country becoming involved in international peacekeeping: 1) civil-

military relations, 2) foreign and economic policy objectives and 3) military budgets and missions. Civil-military relations are crucial to understand because it provides an understanding of who makes policy decisions in a given country. Foreign and economic policy objectives and military budgets and missions are important because they reflect the policy preferences of civilian and military decision makers respectively. The next three chapters analyze the peacekeeping participation of each nation, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to test how these factors played into each nation's decision to take part in peacekeeping operations. Each country chapter will begin with a brief overview of the country's peacekeeping participation over the years. This will be followed by an analysis of how civil-military relations, foreign policy strategy, economic strategy, and finally the military budget and missions have shaped their decisions to participate in PKOs. The fifth chapter will focus on the additional factors that affect regional peacekeeping participation as well as provide overall conclusions and recommendations. The chapter is based on the research of Paul Diehl. In his book International Peacekeeping, he provides one of the few theoretical perspectives on the characteristics of PKOs and specifically Diehl provides an explanation of how regional peacekeeping differs from international peacekeeping. Using a variation on Diehl's analysis, chapter V analyzes the factors that are most likely to impact the participation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in regional peacekeeping.

Using the results of the analysis in chapters II through V, the last part of chapter V provides conclusions for the overall study. Ultimately, Brazil demonstrates the greatest potential to lead a peacekeeping operation in Latin America. Argentina for its part will have to overcome major economic hurdles to be a major contributor to any future peacekeeping operation in the hemisphere. Finally, Chile will be unlikely to be a major player in regional peacekeeping in the near future.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. FRAMEWORK

The end of the Cold War resulted in a termination of the bipolar world order dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. Among the many consequences of the Cold War's demise was the increased ability of the United Nations Security Council to reach consensus on issues of global importance. This increased consensus-building ability led to an unprecedented number of UN resolutions resulting in the deployment of peacekeeping troops to assist in the settlement of conflicts throughout the world. This increase in peacekeeping operations in turn created many opportunities for nations to participate in UN-sponsored military deployments. Nations as powerful as the United States and as powerless as Fiji all took part in peacekeeping operations on virtually every continent.

Although the United Nations itself has no established definition of peacekeeping, it can be defined as “the deployment of unarmed or at most lightly-armed forces in a peaceful environment, normally to buttress a fragile or brittle political arrangement between two or more contending parties.”¹ Peacekeeping as a United Nations function is outlined in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. With the deployment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to monitor the peace after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, today's modern peacekeeping regime was established. Since that time the United Nations has taken part in over fifty peacekeeping operations around the world.² Additionally several other peacekeeping operations have been conducted by temporary international coalitions like the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP) and by regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Peacekeeping by third parties has clearly become an

¹ Richard N. Haass, *Intervention* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 57.

² *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1996).

accepted norm in international relations, but what motivates nations to participate in these operations?

The idea of an international community with members of equal status and equal responsibility is embodied in the United Nations General Assembly. As members of this community, countries are expected to take part in and support the UN's activities. Given this logic, peacekeeping can be viewed as a duty of UN members to do their fair share in ensuring global peace and security. This fair share however does not explain the large contributions in relation to their size of such nations as Fiji, Bangladesh, or Uruguay. Conversely, large nations like Mexico or China participate very little in peacekeeping operations. Rather than participating in peacekeeping out of a utopian desire to show good will as a member of the international community, I propose nations have very concrete reasons for taking part in international peacekeeping operations.

In order to understand a country's reasons for participating in peacekeeping it is necessary to determine who participates in the decision making process, specifically whether it is civilians, military officers, or a combination of both. It is also necessary to know what the decision makers' preferences are regarding peacekeeping participation, and how much influence they have in the decision making process.

Different nations will have different interests at stake in peacekeeping operations. For some nations peacekeeping may be a way to gain recognition in the international community and to provide their military with a viable mission and additional training and equipment. On the other hand, a superpower like the United States will have different interests in peacekeeping. The United States may participate in peacekeeping in order to fulfill its role as a global leader. However, the United States may be expected to provide a bulk of the funding and personnel for peacekeeping operations, while the concrete benefits of participating may be less clear. This lack of concrete benefits may make it more difficult for a superpower to convince its population of the merits of involving its military in an operation in a far off land.

Although nations have their own particular reasons for taking part in peacekeeping, I propose that for the majority of countries these reasons can be combined into three major factors: 1) the state of civil-military relations within the country (i.e.,

whether civilians or military make decisions), 2) foreign policy and economic goals, and 3) the military's budget, roles and missions.

Civil-military relations are the most important factor because in order to understand how a nation makes peacekeeping policy it is crucial to know who in the government holds the power to make these decisions. In a nation where civilian control over the military is strong, peacekeeping decisions will be made based on civilian interests. On the other hand, where the military maintains a high degree of autonomy in determining the missions they will perform, peacekeeping policy will be made more on the basis of military interests. Knowing where the balance of power lies between civilian and military leaders in a country is the first place to start when analyzing peacekeeping policy.

After understanding who makes decisions then one can analyze the major factors shaping the preferences of the decision maker. For civilian decision makers these preferences are likely to be shaped by their general foreign policy goals, their economic strategy, and possibly their desire to divert the military from internal tasks. For military decision makers, the assessment of the internal and external threat situation, their desire to obtain resources, and their view of proper roles and missions for the military would likely determine their preferences with respect to peacekeeping. The following section will discuss more in depth the aforementioned factors and explain why these factors are important.

B. FACTORS IN PEACEKEEPING POLICY

1. Civil-Military Relations

The state of civil-military relations is likely to be a major factor in a nation's decision to participate in peacekeeping because outcomes may be different depending on who is making the ultimate decision. Knowing who makes the decisions is the first step in predicting what the decisions will likely be. This is particularly important in countries that became democracies during the "third wave of democratization"³ that swept through

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993)

much of the world after the Cold War because in these countries it is not always clear whether civilians maintain control over the military.

The degree of civilian control over the military varies greatly within these new democracies. As a result, the ability of civilian leaders to impose new missions (such as peacekeeping) on the military varies as well. Generally where the armed forces maintain a high degree of autonomy and a traditional view of their role as soldiers peacekeeping participation will be minimal. This may be the case even in established democracies where the military is firmly subordinate to civilian rulers. For example in September 1993, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell expressed his concern with the growing involvement of the US military in peacekeeping operations:

“Notwithstanding all of the changes that have taken place in the world, notwithstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace engagement, preventive diplomacy, we have a value system and a culture system within the armed forces of the United States. We have this mission: to fight and win the nation’s wars...”⁴

However, where civilians have greater control over the military establishment peacekeeping can become a prominent role, even in the face of military reluctance.

While it is important to understand the overall dynamics of civil-military relations in a particular country, in order to accurately predict whether a nation is likely to take part in peacekeeping it is necessary to identify the civilian and military preferences with regard to peacekeeping. The following sections will look at these preferences more closely.

2. Civilian Preferences

a. Foreign Policy Goals

A nation’s foreign policy goals are potential factors that influence nations to participate in international peacekeeping. Peacekeeping participation, like international participation in other areas, provides very tangible results for participants. Peacekeeping can provide international exposure for small nations who otherwise may not have the

⁴ Ivo H. Daalder, “Knowing when to say no: the development of US policy for peacekeeping” in *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990’s*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 41.

resources to stand out in the international arena. It can also provide international leadership opportunities for nations who are vying for recognition as regional leaders but who do not have the economic power necessary to achieve this goal. Finally, nations with aspirations to increased leadership in the international community (such as a permanent seat on the Security Council) may also use peacekeeping as a way to achieve their foreign policy goals. Ultimately these nations participate in international peacekeeping in order to improve their status in the global hierarchy and to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Nations with other means to achieve their foreign policy goals should be less likely to depend on peacekeeping for this purpose while those with fewer options may see it as a viable way to achieve their objectives.

b. Economic Goals

Closely related to foreign policy goals (and often a part of foreign policy) are a country's economic goals. Much like foreign policy goals, peacekeeping can be used to further a nation's economic goals by providing positive exposure in the international community. Countries that seek to enter the international economic arena and attract foreign investment in their country, but lack other means of gaining international exposure such as a well respected diplomatic corps or an already strong international economy, might further their goals in the economic sphere by peacekeeping participation.

3. Military Preferences

a. Military Budgets

In as far as the military is concerned a potential major factor when considering peacekeeping participation is the state of the military budget. After the Cold War, many of the world's armed forces saw a decline in budgets commensurate with the perceived decrease in foreign military threats. Peacekeeping operations can provide material incentives in the form of surplus equipment, realistic training, and individual compensation for the peacekeeping soldier. In a military where severe budget cuts result in antiquated equipment, poorly trained soldiers and decreased salaries, UN peacekeeping can mean a welcome supplement to a nation's military capabilities.

b. Military Roles and Missions

Along with the military's budget, another important factor that can determine the military's preferences regarding peacekeeping is the roles and missions of the military. With the end of the Cold War, many of the world's armed forces lost a major external enemy, whether that was the United States or the Soviet Union. Unless the armed forces in these countries perceived other external threats besides the Cold War threats, or had internal missions to justify their existence, they may have found themselves searching for new missions. Peacekeeping might fill the void where armed forces are left without enough viable missions. In other words militaries may be more likely to accept peacekeeping if they feel the need to justify their existence. On the other hand, if the military is secure in their perception of their roles and missions they may be less likely to accept peacekeeping as a major mission area.

4. Regional Peacekeeping Factors

While the above-mentioned factors influence a nation's decision to take part in international peacekeeping, nations often consider additional issues when deciding whether to participate in peacekeeping in their own region of the world because of the inherent differences in regional and international peacekeeping. A major difference between international and regional peacekeeping lies in the fact that nations usually have more at stake in their own region than they do in other regions of the world. Instability in a neighboring country may spread throughout the region or may affect the economic interests of the other countries making the resolution of the conflict in the interest of all nations in the region. On the other hand mounting a peacekeeping operation in a neighboring country may be viewed as intervention in the affairs of another nation and nations may be more cautious when deciding to deploy troops into neighboring territory.

In International Peacekeeping, Paul F. Diehl lays out the characteristics of regional peacekeeping and what he believes are its potential advantages and disadvantages.⁵ As possible advantages he cites: a greater consensus-building ability, greater support from the disputants, better prospects for conflict resolution, and a superior

⁵ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) 119-130.

ability to garner support of third parties. Diehl views as possible disadvantages: lack of resources, less developed organizations compared to the UN, compromise of neutrality, inability to meet extra-regional threats, and an inability to deal with a regional hegemon. In reviewing his advantages and risks of regional peacekeeping, and for the purposes of this thesis, three factors stand out as being of most importance, particularly in the case of Latin America: lack of resources, inability to deal with a regional hegemon, and compromise of neutrality. While his other factors are generally valid, in the case of Latin America they are less relevant. For example, regional organizations are often less developed in the area of peacekeeping than the UN, however the OAS is one of the few regional organizations that actually has experience in peacekeeping. Additionally, for the purpose of this thesis, which is determining a nation's willingness to participate in peacekeeping many of his factors do not apply.

The following factors are a variation on his views. I propose that the foremost factors that might affect a nation's decision to engage in regional peacekeeping are funding of the operation, the existence of a regional hegemon, and the higher stakes involved for the participating nation.

a. Operational Funding

Unlike UN-sponsored operations, regional peacekeeping is funded either by a regional organization or by the participant nations themselves. In the recent multilateral peacekeeping operation in East Timor, INTERFET, Australia took the lead in deploying peacekeepers but ran into problems funding the operation without UN assistance. In order to fund the expedition, Australia introduced a special tax and the continuation of the operation was in jeopardy until the UN replaced the Australians after five months.⁶ The fact that the UN does not generally fund regional operations removes the "cash cow" image that some nations may have of international peacekeeping and may lead them to think twice about their participation.

With the UN out of the funding loop for regional operations, it is left up to the regional organizations or the participants themselves to provide the funding. This may create a dilemma for participating nations. It would be particularly troublesome for those

⁶ Michael Hirsh, "Calling All Regiocops," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2000): 2-8.

nations who see financial gain as a major motivator for taking part in peacekeeping. Even if nations do not intend to gain financially from the operations, they would have to consider whether they could afford participating at all if it were left to their own coffers. For their part regional organizations, unlike the UN, may not have the organizational structure, and therefore the budget, for peacekeeping. Cases of successful regional peacekeeping may require nations other than those participating to provide the funding. In the case of MOMEPE, for example, the disputants, Peru and Ecuador, provided the funding, taking the pressure off the Organization of American States (OAS) and the peacekeepers.⁷ However, it is unlikely that this ideal situation will be replicated in the future.

b. Regional Hegemon

The existence of a nation with a comparatively greater amount of political, military, and economic power than others in the region will surely affect the other nations' decisions to take part in peacekeeping. In the case of the Western Hemisphere, the presence of the United States in all regional matters cannot be overlooked by the other nations in the region. Often the regional hegemon can be the factor between the operation becoming a reality or not. In the Dominican Republic in 1965, the OAS-sponsored Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was made possible only with the funding and support of the United States.⁸ At times, the intervention of the hegemon will be desired by the other nations as this may mean the majority of the resources coming from the hegemon. However, at other times the presence of the hegemon may be a detractor in as much as the other nations may see the multilateral operation as a thinly veiled unilateral hegemonic intervention. Many in Latin America saw the IAPF as a U.S. operation with an OAS stamp on it.⁹

⁷ Marcella, Gabriel and Richard Downes, eds., *Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conflict* (Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press, 1999)

⁸ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) 121.

⁹ Ibid.

Of course, the regional hegemon factor takes on a different light when the hegemon itself is making a decision about entering into an operation. In this case, regional peacekeeping may look like an attractive proposition because a regional or sub-regional hegemon may have the ability to exert its power more freely than when acting as a part of the United Nations. Brazil can be considered a sub-regional hegemon relative to its South American neighbors. Although Brazil would still have to contend with the United States, it can do so from a position of relative power compared to other nations in the region. At the same time, the other nations must also consider Brazil's power in the sub-region when confronting any regional peacekeeping operation.

c. Higher Stakes for the Peacekeeping Participant

Although there may sometimes be high stakes involved when a nation makes a decision regarding international peacekeeping, the likelihood of this is much greater when the operation is within a nation's own region. When operations occur within a region, it is safe to assume that nations will greatly consider their own stakes in a particular country or countries before sending in peacekeeping forces. These interests could be political (e.g., whether the nation involved is considered an ally or adversary) or economic (e.g., amount of investments in that nation). The public may also have more of an opinion on and stake in regional peacekeeping compared to international peacekeeping, therefore posing an additional consideration for political decision makers.

After providing a general framework for analyzing the factors of peacekeeping operations, it is necessary to study the specific cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to see how these factors have affected the decisions of these nations to participate in international peacekeeping. That is the subject of the next three chapters. Chapter V considers whether the patterns of international peacekeeping extend to regional peacekeeping.

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II. ARGENTINA

A. INTRODUCTION

Argentina has been one of the most active nations in the world in the arena of international peacekeeping. This dramatic increase in peacekeeping participation was a result of Argentina's successful transition to civilian control over the military, with the resulting weakening of military autonomy and prestige. The increase was also affected by Argentina's aggressive internationalist foreign and economic policy in the 1990's. Finally, the shrinking military budget and mission for the Argentine armed forces was a third factor affecting Argentina's peacekeeping involvement. The following chapter will analyze Argentina's status in each of these four areas in order to explain the increase in peacekeeping participation in the decade of the 1990's. Before, analyzing these factors, however, the chapter gives a brief overview of Argentina's recent shift toward being a very active participant in international peacekeeping.

B. PATTERNS OF PEACEKEEPING

In recent years, Argentina has been the most active nation in peacekeeping operations in all of Latin America, and among the most active in the world. However, throughout much of its history and well into the 20th century Argentina was not involved in many military operations outside its territory. Apart from several wars in the 19th century, including its war of independence from Spain, Argentina has largely stayed out of global military affairs. In World War I Argentina maintained its neutrality as it did again in World War II, while its neighbor Brazil sent troops to Italy to fight on the allied side. Only in the latter part of the war, when German defeat looked imminent, did Argentina finally declare war on the Axis powers. Finally, in 1982 Argentina fought the British over the Malvinas/Falklands Islands. However, this military excursion was arguably not outside of Argentine territory. Argentina viewed the islands as sovereign territory while Great Britain and the majority of countries outside of Latin America recognized them as a British possession.¹⁰

¹⁰ Herbert C. Huser, "Democratic Argentina's "Global Reach": The Argentine Military in Peacekeeping Operations," *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 3 (1998): 55-69.

After WWII, under the leadership of Juan Peron, and continuing into the 1980's under other military regimes, Argentina focused its security strategy primarily on internal threats from left-wing insurgents. In as much as it did look outside its borders it was primarily concerned with protecting its territory from long-time rivals Brazil and Chile. Consequently, Argentina's military involvement in peacekeeping operations during this period was minimal. Additionally, Argentina saw itself as a leader within the nonaligned movement, currying favor neither with the United States nor with the Soviet Union. This nonaligned status further kept it from involvement in peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, Argentina did start providing very small contingents of observers in the 1950's to UN operations in Iran-Iraq, and Angola.¹¹ Argentina's early token involvement in UN missions was consistent with its traditional self-image as a regional leader within South America. This involvement however remained very small until the Carlos Saul Menem administration starting in 1989.

Menem's first opportunity to deploy forces overseas came in 1990 when the United Nations requested that Argentina provide patrol boats to support the UN Observer Mission in Central America (ONUCA). Argentina responded by sending four of its navy's ships to patrol the Gulf of Fonseca. The next test for Argentina came with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. While most Latin American countries stayed out of the conflict, Argentina stood with the U.S.-led coalition, eventually deploying a destroyer and a frigate as well as several air force transport aircraft. With its involvement in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Argentina became the only Latin American nation to join the coalition, immediately gaining favor with the United States.¹²

In May 1992, Menem deployed a contingent of about 900 soldiers to make up one of the twelve infantry battalions of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). These Argentine troops, made up of experienced volunteers, were stationed in Croatia while staff officers were sent to UNPROFOR headquarters. This time the deployment

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ricardo E. Lagorio, "Institutionalization, Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping Operations: The Argentine Experience," in *International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 124.

demonstrated Menem's large-scale commitment to participating in UN operations. It provided a foundation for what would become perhaps Argentina's most important peacekeeping operation in terms of its world status.

While Argentine troops were involved in UNPROFOR operations, in 1993 president Menem announced the deployment of approximately 390 peacekeepers to support UN operations in Cyprus. The Argentine military maintained a contingent in Cyprus consisting of army, Marine Corps, and air force elements. These troops worked side by side with, among others, British troops against whom Argentina had fought a war just a decade earlier. An even more significant aspect of this operation than the large contingent of Argentines was the announcement in 1997 that Argentine Brigadier General Evergisto de Vergara would be commander of the UN force on Cyprus. The announcement marked the first time that an Argentine would be in command of a major UN operation.¹³

In addition to the above operations, Argentina participated in several other peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990's. The most significant of these were the UN missions in Haiti (115 troops), Kuwait (57 military engineers), and Eastern Slavonia (73 troops) and Guatemala. Additionally, although not a UN operation, Argentina played a key role as a guarantor nation in the Military Observer Mission Ecuador Peru (MOMEP).

Apart from direct participation in peacekeeping operations, a major symbol of Argentina's commitment to global peacekeeping was the establishment of the Argentine Joint Peacekeeping Training Center (CAECOPAZ) in Buenos Aires in 1995.¹⁴ The purpose of CAECOPAZ is to train civilian and military personnel from Argentina and other parts of the world to participate in UN operations. As of 2001, representatives from

¹³ Herbert C. Huser, "Democratic Argentina's "Global Reach": The Argentine Military in Peacekeeping Operations," *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 3 (1998): 55-69

¹⁴ Antonio L. Pala, "Peacekeeping and its effects on Civil-Military Relations: The Argentine Experience" in *International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 148-49.

fourteen countries in Latin America, Europe, and North America have attended courses at CAECOPAZ.¹⁵

In the 1990's, Argentina went from having relatively little involvement in peacekeeping operations to being one of the most active countries in the world in this respect. Argentine participation in UN peacekeeping grew from an average of 20 soldiers between 1983-89, to 100 in 1991 and 3850 in 1993.¹⁶ Between 1994 and 1995 Argentina contributed about 2 percent of all UN peacekeepers. As this thesis will demonstrate, this increase in global participation was no accident and in fact was a direct result of president Menem's internationalist foreign policy.

C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Of the three cases analyzed in this thesis, Argentina is the clearest case of a military subordinate to civilian control. Since the return of democracy to Argentina in 1983, the civilian government has wrested policy-making powers away from the armed forces. Although some authors still argue that civilian control over the Argentine military is not complete,¹⁷ most scholars agree that for the most part civilian leaders have control over the military. Civil-military relations were an important factor in Argentina's increased involvement in peacekeeping in the 1990's because civilian control over the armed forces made it easier for civilian leaders to shift the military's mission drastically towards increased peacekeeping.

The current state of civil-military relations in Argentina is a direct result of the loss of prestige suffered by the Argentine armed forces after their defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982, the human rights abuses of the military government in the 1970's and early 1980's, and the government's mismanagement of the economy. The

¹⁵United Nations Homepage available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/argentina.htm> Internet; accessed 11 June 2001.

¹⁶ Jack Child, "Guns and Roses," Hemisphere Magazine, Vol. 6, no. 3 [on-line]; available from <http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/vol6num3/child.html>; Internet; accessed 13 May 2001.

¹⁷ J. Patrice McSherry, "Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina" (St. Martin's Press, 1997)

first president of the new democracy, Raúl Alfonsín capitalized on the military's loss of face to strip it of all of its political powers.

Alfonsín started with a plan to prosecute military members who had committed human rights violations in the “dirty war,” carried out by the armed forces during the previous military regime. Although this plan eventually ended in several compromises, it was an important blow to the impunity that the armed forces had enjoyed in Argentina for so long.¹⁸ In addition to the strategy to pursue human rights abusers, Alfonsín introduced numerous reforms to reduce the military's autonomy and influence in policy matters. The military budget, defense industries, and defense policy, were all removed from under the direct control of the military and were placed under the oversight of a civilian-led Ministry of Defense.¹⁹ Probably the most important reform with repercussions for Argentina's role in international peacekeeping was the 1988 National Defense Law, which effectively removed the military from having a significant internal role. By stripping the military of an internal role, this legislation opened the way for Argentina's increased role in peacekeeping operations in the 1990's. In the end, Alfonsín was able to strip the military of many of its traditional prerogatives, however his drastic measures led to a military backlash that was manifested in several small uprisings. Not until the subsequent Menem administration were civil-military relations in Argentina more stabilized.

President Menem sought to reincorporate the military into society and to give the armed forces a viable role in the new democracy. The major role that Menem gave the military was that of peacekeeping which not only provided the Argentine armed forces with a reason for being, but also served to further his foreign policy objectives. Menem's foreign policy and the use of peacekeeping in this policy are the subjects of the subsequent sections.

¹⁸ David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Tipping the Civil-Military Balance: Institutions and Human Rights Policy in Democratic Argentina and Chile,” *Comparative Political Studies*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Oct 1998), 633-661.

¹⁹ Wendy Hunter, *State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the military's role in Argentina, Brazil and Chile* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).

D. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PREFERENCES

During the Alfonsín presidency and into the Menem administration, the military was stripped of its autonomy in Argentina and further saw a reprioritization of its missions, to include peacekeeping. During this time of civil-military reforms the civilian leadership, led by president Menem, promoted the use of the military in peacekeeping roles. Largely due to their success in controlling the military and reducing its autonomy, Argentine civilian leaders were able to effectively use the military in an increased peacekeeping capacity.

For its part, the military entered the early 1990's, when most peacekeeping missions occurred, in a state of disrepair financially and in terms of readiness and morale. Rather than looking at peacekeeping as an imposition on their traditional military roles, the Argentine armed forces saw the new mission as an opportunity to regain its lost prestige, in addition to increasing funding and training opportunities. As the following sections will demonstrate, both the Argentine civilian leadership, as well as the military saw peacekeeping as beneficial to their interests.

E. FOREIGN POLICY

As discussed above, Argentina has only recently taken a large role in peacekeeping operations. Specifically with the election of president Menem, Argentina has taken on an increasingly internationalist foreign policy, to include more active participation in peacekeeping operations as a fundamental part of this policy. Menem used Argentina's military forces to gain favor with the Western world, particularly with the United States. The ultimate goal was to improve Argentina's image, not only to garner support from foreign governments but to attract foreign investment as well. As the rationale goes, if Argentina is seen as one of the "advanced countries" then investors would see the country as a good investment risk.

As far as president Menem's foreign policy, one of his major objectives was "increased participation in peacekeeping activities and projecting the image of a reliable international partner."²⁰ More than any other country, this effort was directed at gaining

²⁰ Jose C. d'Odorico, "Argentina Waiting in the Wings for a Chance to Join NATO," *Armed Forces Journal International* 130, no. 7 (February 1993): 38.

favor with the United States. From the time of Menem's inauguration, Argentina took a strong stand of supporting United States policy and voting with the United States on most major issues. This alignment took place at times even when it was unpopular with neighboring countries. Throughout the 1990's, Argentina consistently participated in UN operations along side the United States, to include operations in Haiti, a controversial intervention in Latin American circles.²¹ Most recently in 2001, and even in the wake of a major economic crisis, Argentina under president Fernando de la Rúa continued to support the United States by offering to provide peacekeepers for the operation in Afghanistan.²²

In the end, the strategy has worked well for Argentina. In recent years, the Argentines gained economic, commercial, and political concessions from the United States. One example was the granting of surplus OV-1D Mohawk and C-130 aircraft from the United States and more importantly, in spite of British objections, the US sale of upgraded A4M Skyhawk fighter aircraft.²³ Another international milestone came in 1998 when President Clinton designated Argentina as a major non-NATO ally, making Argentina one of only a handful of nations in the world and the first country in Latin America to receive this designation.²⁴

F. ECONOMIC POLICY

Argentina's economic situation has also greatly influenced its foreign policy and hence its economic policies in the 1990's and into the 21st century. President Menem's foreign policy was clearly aimed at improving Argentina's economic situation, which became dismal during the Alfonsín era. The 1980's saw Argentina experience one of the worst periods of inflation, unemployment, and economic stagnation in its roller coaster-like economic history. While Alfonsín inherited much of the economic problems from the

²¹ Herbert C. Huser, "Democratic Argentina's "Global Reach": The Argentine Military in Peacekeeping Operations," *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 3 (1998): 55-69.

²² Elizabeth G. Book, "Allies Express Support for U.S. War on Terror," *National Defense*, (Arlington, VA: Dec 2001)

²³ Ibid.

previous military regime, his administration was not successful in lifting Argentina out of its economic decline. When Menem was elected in 1989, he proceeded to undertake an economic about face for his country, marked by an aggressive neoliberal economic program.²⁵ One of the most significant economic reforms of the Menem administration was the almost wholesale privatization of Argentine government enterprises to include power, gas, and the railways.²⁶ With this privatization came the need to attract greater international investment. The foreign investment was needed because Argentina did not have the prior economic success enjoyed by Chile or the burgeoning domestic industries manifested in Brazil. This led to the increased internationalist foreign policy and ultimately the increase in peacekeeping discussed above. Argentina's economic policy, much like its foreign policy, was a major factor in its peacekeeping activities in the 1990's.

G. MILITARY BUDGET AND MISSIONS

Another factor that influenced Argentina's increase in peacekeeping operations has been the decline of the military budget and the loss of military missions after the return to democracy. With the return of democracy to Argentina and the end of the Cold War, military budgets have steadily decreased. UN operations have given Argentina a clear economic incentive for participating by allowing them to maintain their training and readiness levels in the face of a shrinking budget.

In 1983, military spending in Argentina represented 3.47% of GDP, or 21.4% of government spending. By the end of the Alfonsín administration in 1988, military spending was down to 2.12% of GDP, or 19.8% of government expenditures.²⁷ The

²⁴ "Presidential Determination No. 98-9 of January 6, 1998: Designation of Argentina as a Major Non-NATO Ally." *The Federal Register*, January 26, 1998.

²⁵ Charles H. Blake, "Economic Reform and Democratization in Argentina and Uruguay: The Tortoise and the Hare Revisited?," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Fall 1998) pp. 1-26.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ruth Stanley, "Modes of Transition v. Electoral Dynamics: Democratic Control of the Military in Argentina and Chile," *Journal of Third World Studies*, (Americus, Fall 2001) pp. 71-91

military budget shrunk even more during the Menem administration. By 1994, military spending was just 1.74% of GDP, or the equivalent of 11.4% of government spending.²⁸ With this major decline in military spending, Argentina, more than any other country analyzed in this thesis, saw a major economic incentive to participate in peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping benefits the Argentine military economically at the institutional as well as the individual level. As an institution, the Argentine military receives payments from the UN for their contributions to peacekeeping. The use of Argentine personnel and equipment is made under a Letter of Assist in which the goods and services needed for the operation are procured by the contributing nation but paid for by the UN.²⁹ Besides just the purely financial benefits, the Argentine military has gained valuable experience in conducting military operations and working in a multilateral environment. As of 1999, 25% of all Argentine army officers and non-commissioned officers had some international peacekeeping experience.³⁰

There is also a financial benefit to the individual soldier participating in UN operations. As an example, the average supplement for a soldier on UN duty is US\$980 per month and an officer on UN observer duty can make between US\$85-\$120 per diem. Considering the average non-commissioned officer salary in Argentina is US\$760, and a captain's salary is around US\$1,500, it is no wonder that during the initial deployment to UNPROFOR there were many more volunteers than billets available.³¹ These financial incentives have clearly been important in convincing the Argentine military of the merits of establishing peacekeeping as a major mission area.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Herbert C. Huser, "Democratic Argentina's "Global Reach": The Argentine Military in Peacekeeping Operations," *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 3 (1998): 55-69.

³⁰ Jack Child, "Guns and Roses," *Hemisphere Magazine*, Vol. 6, no. 3 [on-line]; available from <http://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/vol6num3/child.html>; Internet; accessed 13 May 2001.

³¹ Antonio L. Pala, "Peacekeeping and its effects on Civil-Military Relations: The Argentine Experience" in *International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 138.

In addition to the financial need imposed by the civilian reforms of the new democracy, the loss of military missions has also affected Argentina's decision to participate in peacekeeping. As stated above the National Defense Law of 1988 effectively removed the Argentine military from the role of internal security. With one of their major missions taken away from them the Argentine armed forces were in need of a new reason for being. Although external defense was, and still is, officially the number one mission, decreasing border tensions with Brazil and Chile in the 1980's left the military without a viable role. Peacekeeping gave the military an honorable external mission and a much needed morale boost.

H. CONCLUSION

Argentina's civil-military relations, foreign policy, and, military status made it an ideal candidate for increased involvement in international peacekeeping operations in the 1990's. With firm civilian control over the military, president Menem's plans to increase the armed forces' role in peacekeeping to further his foreign and economic goals was successfully carried out. On the part of the military, besides not having the necessary autonomy to resist the imposition of new roles and mission, it saw peacekeeping as a way to regain some of the status it lost in the years since the military regime.

III. BRAZIL

A. INTRODUCTION

Brazil has traditionally held a view of itself as a regional, as well as a world leader. Accordingly, Brazil long ago developed an elite diplomatic corps. In addition, Brazil strives for positions of international leadership, particularly in the UN. This desire to lead also manifests itself in its peacekeeping record. The following chapter will demonstrate how Brazilian foreign policy objectives have been the major factors affecting its participation in international peacekeeping. Additionally, it will explain how economic policy, and military budgets and missions have provided few incentives for Brazilian participation in PKOs. Compared to Argentina and Chile, Brazil has maintained a consistent and medium level presence in PKOs, consistent with their image as leaders in the international arena. As with the chapter on Argentina, this chapter begins with an overview of Brazilian peacekeeping activities.

B. PATTERNS OF PEACEKEEPING

Brazil has a long history in UN peacekeeping operations dating back to the 1940's. As a founding member of the UN, Brazil took an active role in the organization's operations from the very beginning. In 1947, Brazil sent observers to Greece as part of a UN contingent during the Greek civil war. In 1956 Brazil was one of ten countries to make up the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Gaza Strip. From 1956 until the end of the operation in 1967, Brazil contributed over 6,000 troops to UNEF I. The next Brazilian contribution came shortly after in 1958 when it sent an air force contingent as part of the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). In 1960 when violence broke out in the Congo in wake of that country's independence from Belgium, a group of Brazilian air force pilots deployed to support the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Brazilian troops maintained a presence there until the end of the operation in 1964.

Besides taking part in UN-sponsored operations, Brazil was also active in its own region. In 1965, it sent troops in support of the OAS-sponsored Inter-American Peace Force (FIM), established to maintain order and peace in the Dominican Republic. Brazil sent an infantry battalion totaling 3,000 personnel from 1965 until 1966. In addition to the infantry troops, Brazil provided two generals as commanders of the FIM and provided

logistical support with its navy and air force. Between 1962 and 1965 Brazil took part in several smaller UN operations in New Guinea, Pakistan, and Cyprus.³²

More recently, Brazil has participated in many peacekeeping operations in Latin America and throughout the world. Among the most notable in recent years have been its deployments to UNAVEM I, II, and III, in Angola; UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia; ONUMOZ in Mozambique; MOMEPA at the Ecuador-Peru border; and UNTAET in East Timor. In all of the preceding operations, Brazil provided either a general officer as operational commander, or in the case of UNTAET, a Civilian Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator.³³

C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Unlike Argentina, the current state of civil-military relations in Brazil is less clear. There are at least two schools of thought on the matter of Brazilian civil-military relations. Some scholars like Wendy Hunter believe that since the end of military rule in 1985 there has been a clear decline in military prerogatives. According to Hunter “democratically elected politicians have successfully contested the military over a broad range of issues and narrowed its sphere of political influence.”³⁴ Her argument is based on the belief that elected politicians have a vested interest in diminishing military influence in politics in order to further their own political aspirations, and according to Hunter, the civilian politicians have been successful in doing this.

An opposing view is held by Jorge Zaverucha who views military influence in Brazil as very strong in spite of democratic reforms, particularly due to the prerogatives that the armed forces are guaranteed in the 1988 constitution. Article 142 of the Brazilian constitution defines the military as the “guardian of constitutional powers, of the law, and

³² Presidência da República, Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas, Ministerio da Defesa do Brasil. (1996). *O Brasil E Suas Forças Armadas*. United Nations Homepage available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 April 2001.

³³ United Nations Homepage available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 April 2001.

³⁴ Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 2.

of public order.”³⁵ Zaverucha also points to the continued role of the military in internal roles such as domestic intelligence and police operations as evidence of their continued influence.

The actual state of civil-military relations and specifically of military prerogatives and influence is probably somewhere in between the two views. The creation of a civilian ministry of defense in 1999 by president Fernando Henrique Cardoso surely appears to be another step towards diminishing military influence and would lend credence to Hunter’s argument. However, according to Joao Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker the military has purposely given in to certain reforms such as the new ministry of defense in order to achieve victories in other areas. By the same token although Cardoso successfully instituted the civilian defense minister as a permanent part of his cabinet, he has appeased the military by supporting salary increases (in spite of budget cuts in other sectors of government, promising military modernization, and allowing the military to continue its Amazonian development project.³⁶ In reviewing the evidence, it becomes clear that civil-military relations in Brazil vary according to issue area. Thus, it is necessary to examine the role of civilians and the military in foreign policy decision-making, the sphere most relevant for peacekeeping.

Most scholars generally agree that since the return of democracy in 1985, the Brazilian foreign ministry, known as Itamaraty, has taken over as the major player in foreign policy matters. However depending on the subject matter other agencies may take the lead in making foreign policy decisions. For example, the economic ministry often makes policy regarding trade matters. Similarly, the military has maintained at least some influence in defense matters, particularly in peacekeeping. In 1991, when the UN requested Brazilian troops for a peacekeeping operation in Namibia, the foreign ministry agreed but the army was able to overturn the decision. However, the opposite occurred in 1995 when the military approved the deployment of troops to Angola and the finance and

³⁵ Jorge Zaverucha, *Prerrogativas militares: de Sarney a Cardoso*. Monitor Publico 4, 12 (January-March 1997): 35-41.

³⁶ Joao R. Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker, “The Brazilian military under Cardoso: Overcoming the identity crisis,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42, no. 3 (Fall 2000): pp. 143-170.

planning ministries delayed the action for economic reasons.³⁷ With respect to peacekeeping, it appears that although civilian leaders make policy decisions in Brazil, the military still has some capacity to veto those decisions.

D. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PREFERENCES

Brazilian civilian leaders view peacekeeping as but one component in the overall goal of ascending to world power status. In the same way as Brazil volunteers to fill important positions in the UN civilian structure, including the Security Council, it has traditionally participated in peacekeeping to show that it does its fair share of the work on the military side. In addition, Brazil has preferred filling key positions of leadership in peacekeeping operations rather than sending large numbers of troops. Brazilian civilian decision makers, therefore, see a medium level of participation in peacekeeping as the most appropriate role for Brazil.

As far as the military leadership in Brazil, they too see a medium role as the best for their interests. Participation of high-ranking Brazilian officers in peacekeeping operations lends a degree of prestige to the military establishment. Along with its participation with the Allies in World War II,³⁸ the Brazilian military sees a limited amount of peacekeeping participation as a benefit to its international image. Unlike Argentina, however, it does not need to increase its role in peacekeeping because it has sufficient legitimate internal missions to justify its existence. The remainder of the chapter will provide more in depth analysis of how these civilian and military preferences are manifested in Brazil.

E. FOREIGN POLICY

In 1908, during a conference at Yale University, Brazil's first ambassador to the United States, Joaquim Nabuco said, "Brazil has always been conscious of its size and

³⁷ Rex A. Hudson, ed. *Brazil: A Country Study*, (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1997).

³⁸ Brian Loveman, *For La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1999), 140.

has been governed by a prophetic sentiment with regard to its future."³⁹ This “prophetic sentiment” continues to drive Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century. Due to its continental proportions and vast resources, Brazil aspires to be a world leader, politically and economically. In addition, due to its size and resources, it holds on strongly to the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention. Its aspirations to world leadership and protection of its sovereignty are recurring themes in Brazilian foreign and defense policy, to include peacekeeping policy.

Two trends predominate in Brazilian foreign policy. First, since the 1990’s Brazil has been more likely than Argentina to maintain a foreign policy independent of the United States.⁴⁰ This stems from the fact that Brazil feels strongly about the principle of non-intervention, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, and values the importance of national sovereignty over internationalization. Argentina on the other hand appears to have given up its past aspirations for world power status and has settled for a share of the power in South America.

A second characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy has been its tendency to seek out positions of leadership in international politics, primarily through international organizations such as the United Nations in order to achieve its world power status. Brazil has done this mainly through its highly professional diplomatic corps in the foreign ministry. In line with its foreign policy, a characteristic of Brazil’s peacekeeping policy has been its proclivity to participate in operations in countries that it believes to be within its sphere of influence, where it can exert a leadership role. In most cases, Brazil considers former Portuguese colonies, with which it shares a cultural and linguistic bond, to be in its sphere of influence. Accordingly, Brazil has been most active and arguably most effective in fellow former Portuguese colonies such as Angola, Mozambique, and most recently East Timor. Brazil has not, however, been as persuaded by mere regional

³⁹ Celso Lafer, “Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, present, and future,” *Daedalus* (Spring 2000): pp. 207.

⁴⁰ Wendy Hunter, *State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the military’s role in Argentina, Brazil and Chile* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).

proximity, particularly where the United States has the leadership role, as evidenced by their virtual lack of involvement in the peacekeeping operation in Haiti.

1. Non-intervention

Brazil maintains a foreign policy based on national sovereignty and non-intervention in the Western Hemisphere. As a result, Brazil has been reluctant to enter into any agreements based on collective intervention.⁴¹ Brazil's non-interventionist foreign policy stems from its own hegemonic aspirations and a fear that supporting interventionism in the Western Hemisphere may some day result in US involvement in the Brazilian Amazon.⁴² Today one of Brazil's major strategic priorities is the development and defense of the Amazon basin, primarily through the military project known as "Calha Norte"⁴³ Accordingly, nationalism is still a strong force in the Brazilian military and there is a distrust of US military expansion in Latin America, and particularly in the Amazon region. While this has not completely kept Brazil out of participating in multilateral peacekeeping, it has ensured that it remains selective in the types of operations that it supports. At the same time Brazilian foreign policy has involved a sensitive balancing act between staying independent in its actions and maintaining good relations with the US, who after all is still the major superpower in the region and the world, and is an important ally for Brazil economically and militarily. An example of Brazil's solidarity with the US was its call to invoke the Rio Treaty (the Western Hemisphere defense pact) after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. However, Brazil, more than any country in the Hemisphere (with the exception of Cuba) occasionally professes a foreign policy position at odds with the

⁴¹ Andrew F. Cooper and Thomas Legler, "The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and National Leadership," *Latin American Politics and Society* 43, no. 1 (Spring 2001): pp. 103-126.

⁴² Monica Hirst, "Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone" in *International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 112.

⁴³ Armando Amorim Ferreira Vidigal, "The Brazilian Armed Forces and Defence Policy," *Military Technology* 25, no. 4 (Apr 2001): p. 12.

United States. An example of this was Brazil's position on the US-led intervention in Haiti.

When a military coup overthrew Haitian president Jean Bertrand Aristide in September 1991, the Organization of American States (OAS), with the support of the United States, imposed an embargo on the military junta.⁴⁴ After 18 months of ineffective sanctions however, the OAS urged the UN Security Council (UNSC) to strengthen the embargo. Among the few OAS members to oppose UNSC involvement in Haiti was Brazil. Although it failed in keeping the UNSC out of the situation, Brazil successfully convinced fellow OAS members to drop a proposal to impose a naval blockade of Haiti.⁴⁵ Later in 1994 when the UNSC adopted a resolution to use force in Haiti, Brazil was one of only two abstentions (China being the other) with 12 votes in favor of using force. Coincidentally, many other Latin American countries that were not on the Security Council also did not favor the use of force in Haiti. This episode clearly demonstrated Brazil taking a stand against US foreign policy and opting not to partake in a peacekeeping intervention in its own hemisphere, which it deemed to be a violation of sovereignty. By contrast, Argentina supported the use of force in Haiti.⁴⁶

2. World Power Aspirations

The other important characteristic in Brazil's foreign policy has been its tendency to express its desire to be a world power by seeking positions of leadership in world politics, particularly within the United Nations. A prime example of this is its stated goal of achieving a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), when and if this body expands its membership. Brazil has traditionally been a supporter of international organizations and was a founding member of the League of Nations in 1920

⁴⁴ David Malone, "Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study," *Survival* 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997): pp. 127-129.

⁴⁵ David P. Forsythe, "The United Nations, Democracy, and the Americas" in *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas*, ed. Tom Farer (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 128.

⁴⁶ David Malone, "Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study," *Survival* 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997): p. 127-129.

and the UN in 1945.⁴⁷ In addition, it has chaired the UNSC on various occasions, most recently in 1999. Like other nations of medium power, such as Sweden or Canada, Brazil has used international organizations as a way to exercise its influence and counterbalance that of the superpowers. In order to support its international diplomatic endeavors, Brazil relies on a highly competent and professional foreign service. Potential Brazilian foreign service personnel are selectively recruited, and put through a rigorous academic training program, resulting in highly skilled diplomats and negotiators.⁴⁸

In accordance with its foreign policy, Brazil's peacekeeping policy has also showed an affinity to become involved in UN operations where it can hold positions of leadership, particularly in countries that it considers within its sphere of influence. Specifically Brazil has been heavily involved in countries that like itself are former colonies of Portugal, specifically Angola, Mozambique and East Timor.

By taking part in peacekeeping in these countries, Brazil sees the opportunity to fill a leadership void in the Portuguese-speaking world. This view is supported by Brazil experts like Monica Hirst, executive director of the Center of Brazilian Studies in Argentina, who claims, "the presence of Brazilian officers has become...important in Portuguese-speaking African countries...where cultural and linguistic familiarity together with a previous diplomatic presence have been relevant incentives."⁴⁹ Brazil has even gone so far as to propose the formation of a peacekeeping force comprised of the seven members of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), predictably with Brazil playing a key leadership role.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Rex A. Hudson, ed. *Brazil: A Country Study*, (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1997)

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Monica Hirst, "Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone" in *International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 112.

⁵⁰ "CPLP Announces Regional Peacekeeping Force," *The Angolan Mission Observer: Publication of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations* Vol. 4, #3, May/June 2000, 5.

In 1994, Brazil deployed a force of 264 troops to ONUMOZ in Mozambique. This deployment was the largest deployment of Brazilian combat troops since the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic. Brazil eventually increased its contingent in Mozambique to 1,200 troops, making them one of the major contributors to the operation. They also provided a general officer as chief military observer to the mission.⁵¹ Similarly between 1988 and 1997 Brazil supported UNAVEM I, II, and III in Angola with over 1,200 troops, including several general officers as operational commanders.⁵² More recently, Brazil was one of the first countries to lend support to the Australian-led UN intervention in East Timor, (another former Portuguese colony) under the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET). Additionally, Brazil was one of the sponsors of the UNSC resolution to establish UNTAET.⁵³ Besides supporting UNTAET with a contingent of military police troops, a Brazilian, Sergio Vieira de Mello, was named Civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator in East Timor.⁵⁴

This dynamic in Brazilian foreign policy illustrates an interesting point for future peacekeeping. Brazil tends to focus its attention towards areas where it is less likely to compete for leadership with the United States, particularly in its perceived sphere of influence. Given this affinity towards striving for positions of leadership in peacekeeping, it may be less likely in the future to support a peacekeeping operation in Latin America where the US is fully in charge without sharing some of the leadership responsibilities. An example of a successful regional peacekeeping operation where the United States and

⁵¹ Antonio L. Palá, "Peacekeeping and its effects on Civil-Military Relations: The Argentine Experience" in *International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 134.

⁵² United Nations Homepage available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 April 2001.

⁵³ "UN Security Council Decision on East Timor," UN Press Release SC/6745, 25 October 1999.

⁵⁴ Presidência da República, Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas, Ministério da Defesa do Brasil. (1996). *O Brasil E Suas Forças Armadas*. United Nations Homepage available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 April 2001.

Brazil both participated in the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP). A Brazilian general led this operation.⁵⁵

In reviewing Brazilian foreign policy strategy, it is evident that it has a major impact on its peacekeeping policy. In order to defend its own sovereignty, Brazil adamantly defends the principle of non-intervention in the Western Hemisphere and is reluctant to support peacekeeping operations in the region, even at the expense of coming into disagreement with the US. On the other hand, Brazil uses international peacekeeping in order to promote its own global leadership aspirations.

F. ECONOMIC POLICY

Like its foreign policy, Brazil's economic policy seeks to increase its power and prestige in the global community. In order to improve its status economically, Brazil has pursued primarily a regional approach. Brazil's regional approach to economic success has precluded it from using peacekeeping as a way to achieve economic goals, in the way that Argentina did. Instead, it has relied on a regional approach in which it sees itself as the economic leader in South America and its large domestic market to attract foreign investors.

With the establishment of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur/Mercosul), Brazil became the dominant partner in one of the world's major economic integration projects.⁵⁶ Mercosur has allowed Brazil to maintain comparative advantage in many of its domestic industries, that otherwise might not compete favorably if opened to the global economy. Brazil views these domestic industries, especially automobiles and information systems as a symbol of their world leadership status. Although Brazil supports the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), as stated by foreign minister Celso Lafer, "Mercosul is our destiny, while the FTAA is an option."⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Glenn R. Weidner, "Operation Safe Border: The Ecuador-Peru Crisis," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Spring 1996): pp. 52-58.

⁵⁶ Peter H. Smith, "Strategic Options for Latin America," in *Latin America in the New International System*, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin & Ralph H. Espach (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 48.

⁵⁷ Celso Lafer. Speech given at the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, D.C., March 1, 2001.

As far as foreign investment, Brazil's population of roughly 175,000⁵⁸ is in itself an attractive feature for outside investors. In sum, with its regional economic plan, domestic industries, and large consumer market, Brazil has not needed peacekeeping as a way to improve its economy. The following section explores the impact of military budget and missions on Brazil's peacekeeping ventures.

G. MILITARY BUDGET AND MISSIONS

While Brazil's foreign policy has been a major influence on its peacekeeping activities, military resources have been less of an influence. Brazil's armed forces have suffered less from budget cuts and loss of missions than have Argentina's and therefore have seen less of a need to supplement these with peacekeeping operations. In addition, the Brazilian military has maintained a large number of internal missions, especially the expanding mission in the Amazon region. This "job security" has precluded the military from needing to increase its peacekeeping involvement.

The Brazilian military went through several stages of budget cuts since the end of the military government in 1985. The first democratically elected president José Sarney (1985-1990), did little to alter the military's budget since at this time the military still held a great deal of influence after the pacted transition to democracy.⁵⁹ Not until the reformist Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) became president was the military budget affected dramatically. Collor aggressively attacked military prerogatives including slashing the budget. However, his impeachment in 1992 cut short his presidency, and slowed the momentum of his military reform policies.⁶⁰ His vice president and successor, Itamar Franco (1992-1994) lacked the political influence to carry out Collor's reforms, such as military restructuring.

⁵⁸CIA World Factbook, 2001, online at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>

⁵⁹ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) p. 169.

⁶⁰ Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile," in *Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America*, ed. Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press, 1998) pp. 303-04.

As it turned out, any prospects for major military budget cuts perished with the impeachment of Collor. In 1994, Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso took the reins of the presidency and made economic development the number one priority of his administration. At the same time he played a delicate balancing game with the military, attempting to exert civilian control (culminating in the creation of the civilian-led Ministry of Defense) while appeasing the military financially. This financial appeasement came largely in the form of a constitutional amendment proposed by Cardoso in 1996 that prevented military salaries from being cut, as was called for by the economic austerity measures of the Real Plan of 1994.⁶¹ In the end, military salaries were not only saved from the budget axe, but in fact were increased. Other aspects of the defense budget also received boosts during this period including a modernization plan for all branches of the armed forces.

Much like the budget, military missions in Brazil have remained relatively constant since the 1980's. Again, this is an area where Brazil and Argentina differ. In Brazil, many of the traditional internal roles carried out by the military are still a part of their mandate. Internal security and civic action projects are still accepted by the military and the public as legitimate military roles. The sweeps of the crime and drug infested *favelas* (slums) by military units throughout the 1990's and the more recent replacement of striking police in Salvador, Bahía, with military troops are just two examples of how the armed forces maintain a strong internal security role.⁶² In addition to the internal roles, the defense of the Amazon basin gives the Brazilian military a major external defense role as well. Neither the military budget nor military missions changed drastically in Brazil after 1985. As a result, neither of these factors provided incentives for civilians or the military to advocate increased participation in peacekeeping.

⁶¹ Joao R. Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker, "The Brazilian military under Cardoso: Overcoming the identity crisis," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42, no. 3 (Fall 2000): pp. 143-170.

⁶² Larry Rohter, "Brazil Weighs Replacing Police Strikers with Troops," *New York Times*, 28 Jul 2001, sec. A4.

H. CONCLUSION

Brazil's peacekeeping participation has been affected primarily by its foreign policy strategy. Brazil seeks a role as world leader and uses peacekeeping as a secondary method to civilian diplomacy as a way to achieve its goals. Its economic policy, although also ultimately aimed at attaining world status, is more focused on a regional strategy and is therefore not as reliant on international peacekeeping. Finally, Brazil's military budget and its roles and missions have survived the end of the Cold War relatively unchanged and therefore have not been a reason to increase its participation in international peacekeeping.

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IV. CHILE

A. INTRODUCTION

Chile's military has seen relatively little action in the sphere of international peacekeeping. Although it has participated since 1949 in UN operations, its contributions have always been minimal in terms of personnel, even in the post-Cold War era of increased peacekeeping. The main impetus for Chile's lack of participation in peacekeeping in the period following the Pinochet dictatorship is the high level of autonomy maintained by its armed forces. Additionally the strategic doctrine of traditional territorial defense that has persisted in the military has kept Chile out of new mission areas for the most part. Finally, the robust budget and secure role of the military in Chile has obviated the need to increase its participation in peacekeeping missions.

B. PATTERNS OF PEACEKEEPING

Compared to its Southern Cone neighbors Chile has had relatively little experience in peacekeeping operations.⁶³ Chile's first experience in UN peacekeeping came in 1949 with the UN Military Observer Group in Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Since 1949 Chile has continued to send small groups of officers to UNMOGIP and over the years, the Chilean contribution has reached over 100 personnel. Chile's next operational involvement in UN peacekeeping came in 1967 when it sent its first observers to support the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East. Chile has consistently sent two officers per year to UNTSO. In 1969 under the purview of the OAS, Chile sent two officers to support the observer mission to monitor the cease-fire between El Salvador and Honduras after a border conflict flared up between the two countries.⁶⁴ Twenty-four years passed before Chile was to see another peacekeeping operation. In 1991, Chile provided a helicopter to support the UN-imposed buffer zone in Iraq and

⁶³ Wendy Hunter, *State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the military's role in Argentina, Brazil and Chile* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).

⁶⁴ "Participacion del Ejercito de Chile en Operaciones de Mantenimiento de Paz," Pagina Web del Ejercito de Chile; available from <http://www.ejercito.cl/internacional/mantpaz.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 May 01.

Kuwait (UNIKOM).⁶⁵ This was followed by participation in ONUSAL in El Salvador in 1992, UNTAC in Cambodia in 1992-93, and OAS-sponsored demining efforts in 1993.⁶⁶ In all these cases, Chilean involvement was limited to several officers per operation. With the outbreak of the border conflict between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, Chile found itself sending observers, as one of the four guarantor nations under the Rio Protocol (the US, Brazil, and Argentina being the others) to oversee the cease-fire. This operation lasted from 1995 until 1999. In 1996, Chile took part in the UN Special Commission in Iraq (UNSCOM) and in 1997, several Chilean officers were deployed in support of UNMIBH in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The most recent deployment of Chilean troops in a peacekeeping operation came in 2000 when it sent a contingent of 34 troops (large by Chilean standards) to East Timor in support of UNTAET.⁶⁷

In cases where Chile takes part in peacekeeping, it uses very specific criteria for involvement as outlined in its foreign and security policies. In recent years, the UN and the United States have put more pressure on Chile to take on a larger role in peacekeeping operations. In spite of this pressure, Chile has continued to send only small numbers of personnel, primarily in the role of observers. On some occasions it has even rejected requests for troops from the UN and has resisted the idea of establishing a rapid reaction force for peacekeeping operations such as exists in other countries.⁶⁸

According to the Chilean Permanent Mission to the United Nations, explicit criteria are used to decide upon its participation in peacekeeping operations. Among these is the specific stipulation that Chile will only participate in a mission where “the parties

⁶⁵ Antonio L. Pala, “Peacekeeping and its effects on Civil-Military Relations: The Argentine Experience” in *International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 134.

⁶⁶ “Operaciones de Mantenimiento de Paz,” Pagina Web de la Mision de Chile Ante las Naciones Unidas; available from <http://www.un.int/chile/misionesdepaz>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2001.

⁶⁷ Juan Rauld, “Chile Participaría en Operaciones ONU de Imposición de la Paz,” *La Segunda*, 14 March 2001.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

involved in the conflict have previously required the intervention of peace forces.”⁶⁹ In other words, Chile generally will only take part in UN missions under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter (peacekeeping) and will not become involved in Chapter 7 missions, which entail peace enforcement with or without the consent of the warring parties.⁷⁰ These strict rules for peacekeeping participation may simply be a result of a non-interventionist foreign policy, similar to Brazil’s. However, this policy also ensures that the Chilean military’s contributions to peacekeeping will stay at a low level.

C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Of the three cases studied in this thesis, Chile’s armed forces are generally considered as having the greatest autonomy vis-à-vis their civilian leaders. According to Claudio Fuentes, since the return of democracy in Chile, institutions and political culture have both encouraged the continued autonomy of the military.⁷¹ Gregory Weeks further illustrates the ability of Chile’s military to circumvent civilian institutions in order to achieve their goals.⁷²

The Constitution of 1980, carried over from the Pinochet era, guarantees Chile’s military autonomy. The constitution gives the armed forces specific political powers, particularly the guarantee of having four designated members of the senate, who are chosen from among the former commanders of each of the armed forces.⁷³ Possibly more important to the military’s autonomy than the senatorial appointments, are the constitutional guarantees regarding the military budget. The first guarantee ensures that military funding cannot fall below 1989 military expenditure levels in real terms. Second,

⁶⁹ “Operaciones de Mantenimiento de Paz,” Pagina Web de la Mision de Chile Ante las Naciones Unidas; available from <http://www.un.int/chile/misionesdepaz>; Internet; accessed 27 May 2001.

⁷⁰ Richard N. Haass, *Intervention* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 57.

⁷¹ Claudio Fuentes, “After Pinochet: Civilian Policies Toward the Military in the 1990s Chilean democracy,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, (Beverly Hills, CA Fall 2000), 111-142.

⁷² Gregory Weeks, “Democratic Institutions and Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Chile,” *Journal of Third World Studies*, (Americus, Spring 2001) 78.

⁷³ Rex A. Hudson, ed. *Chile: A Country Study*, (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994)

the military is guaranteed 10 per cent of export profits from Chile's nationalized copper industry.⁷⁴ These constitutional privileges give the military in Chile enough autonomy to influence decision making in the defense arena, including military roles and missions.

Chilean military autonomy has allowed the armed forces to maintain the traditional military mission of external defense as its main role. Unlike Argentina, where the military lost most of its autonomy after the re-establishment of democracy, Chile's military was not forced into adopting peacekeeping as a major role.

In spite of having the second largest military in the Southern Cone with about 102,000 personnel, (compared to 65,000 for Argentina), Chile has chosen not to become extensively involved in peacekeeping operations.⁷⁵ The primary reason for not being as involved in peacekeeping operations as its Southern Cone neighbors is that Chile's military still holds on to a great degree of autonomy in policy making vis-à-vis the civilian policymakers and it does not see extensive involvement in peacekeeping as being in its best interest. Additionally, Chile continues to subscribe to a traditional national security policy focused towards defending its borders from foreign aggression.⁷⁶ Chile sees conventional defense as the number one mission of its military and it views external peacekeeping as only a minor role. However, Chile has not been completely absent from global peacekeeping. Notwithstanding its contributions have been minimal in terms of personnel and are made mostly to avoid a negative international image.

⁷⁴ Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile," in *Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America*, ed. Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press, 1998) pp. 308.

⁷⁵ Brazil is #1 in the Southern Cone and Latin America with 285,000 troops. Isacson, A and Olson, J. (1998). Just the Facts: A Quick Tour of U.S. Defense and Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, D.C.: Latin America Working Group and the Center for International Policy.

⁷⁶ Wendy Hunter, *State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the military's role in Argentina, Brazil and Chile* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).

D. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PREFERENCES

In the “Book of the National Defense of Chile,” published by the civilian-led Ministry of Defense, the Chilean government clearly explains its strict criteria for participation in international peacekeeping missions.⁷⁷ These strict criteria presented by Chile’s civilian leadership, and their resistance to pressure from the United States to increase Chilean participation in peacekeeping give the impression that civilians do not desire an expanded role in peacekeeping for the military.

However, civilian leaders in Chile have professed their commitment to peacekeeping. In May 2000, the Chilean defense ministry hosted an international peacekeeping seminar. According to then defense minister María Soledad Alvear, the purpose of the seminar was to reiterate Chile’s commitment to UN peacekeeping.⁷⁸ Similarly, Chile announced plans to open a peacekeeping training center similar to Argentina’s CAECOPAZ.⁷⁹ Finally, according to Chile’s Permanent Mission to the UN, the country will increase its participation in peacekeeping. However, in spite of these statements, as of June 2001, Chile had 50 peacekeepers deployed around the world (compared to 658 from Argentina).⁸⁰ Additionally, as will be discussed in the sections on military budget and missions, Chile continues to maintain a defense policy aimed at conventional defense. There appears to be an inconsistency between civilian leaders’ statements and Chile’s actions regarding peacekeeping. There are at least two possibilities to account for these inconsistencies. It could be that Chile’s civilian decision makers do not really want to make a major commitment to peacekeeping and they are just be paying lip service to the international community in order to maintain a good image.

⁷⁷ Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile, *Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile*, 1997.

⁷⁸ Ministra Alvear Inauguro Seminario Internacional Sobre Mantenimiento de la Paz, 15 May 2000. Available online at [http://www.minrel.cl/prensa/comunicados/15-05-00\(2\).html](http://www.minrel.cl/prensa/comunicados/15-05-00(2).html)

⁷⁹ Subsecretario de Guerra Anuncia Creación de Centro de Entrenamiento Para la Paz, *Primera Línea*, 1 June 2001. Available online at <http://www.un.int/chile/Prensa/recortes20010601>

⁸⁰ Chile Aumenta Presencia en Fuerzas de Paz, *El Mercurio*, 11 June 2001. Available online at <http://www.un.int/chile/Prensa/recortes20010611>

On the other hand, the military may still hold enough influence to keep civilians from implementing major changes in their roles and mission. I propose that the second possibility is true. Military preferences regarding peacekeeping appear to have more influence in Chile's policy for peacekeeping.

Military preferences regarding peacekeeping are quite clear. Given the military's self image as the protector of the Chilean republic, and its commitment to traditional territorial defense, peacekeeping is not viewed as a desirable or necessary mission by the military. On the other hand, the military has participated in small numbers in peacekeeping operations, as well as multinational peacekeeping exercises. While the Chilean military values maintaining a positive international image, and will take part in multilateral operations to preserve this image, it is not willing to compromise its primary mission of territorial defense.

E. FOREIGN POLICY

Chile's foreign policy goals in the 1990's have not served as an impetus for increasing its level of participation in peacekeeping. The major goal of its foreign policy after the Pinochet era was to reinsert Chile into the international diplomatic arena and to resolve existing border disputes with neighboring countries. To achieve both of these goals, Chile relied on its well-respected civilian diplomatic corps. The following section describes Chile's foreign policy in the post-Pinochet era and explains why peacekeeping was not necessary to achieve its goals in this arena.

Chile's diplomatic service has historically been well respected around the world largely due to the traditional prestige of Chile's democratic institutions. Although the Pinochet era resulted in a set back in its democratic institutions, the return of democracy has thrust Chile back into the international arena. Bolstered by its strong political ties to European Christian Democratic and Socialist parties and its strong economic performance, Chile enjoys international influence beyond its size.⁸¹

Unlike Argentina's post-authoritarian foreign policy strategy of aggressive insertion into the international arena (international peacekeeping was one part of this strategy), since the end of the Pinochet era Chile has taken a more gradual approach to

⁸¹ Hudson.

internationalization. Somewhat like Brazil, Chile has been selective about its alignment posture with the U.S. As a result, peacekeeping has not played a major role in foreign policy.

Traditionally, Chile's foreign and defense policy has been based on the defense of its borders from foreign aggression, especially from its traditional rivals Argentina and Peru. This distrust of its neighbors is due in part to its geographic position. Chile is a long nation (over 5,000 kilometers from north to south), but a very narrow nation (only 200 kilometers average width).⁸² With no nation to act as a buffer between itself and Argentina, these geographical realities over the years have engendered a "siege mentality." Although, Chile has not gone to war with one of its neighbors in over a century, as recently as 1978 it almost went to war with Argentina over the Beagle Channel.⁸³

However, since the end of the Pinochet era Chile has taken strides to resolve its border issues with its neighbors. Starting with a border agreement with Argentina in 1991 Chile has made the resolution of historic disputes with its neighbors one of its primary foreign policy goals. During the 1990's, Chile also made great strides in its relationship with Peru, although as of the end of the decade this process was still ongoing.⁸⁴ In spite of this resolution of border disputes, Chilean defense policy continues to stress traditional defense. A recent example is its purchase of F-16 fighters for its air force.⁸⁵ This seems to be at odds with its foreign policy and can likely be explained by the continued influence of the military in defense matters.

⁸² David Pion-Berlin, "Will soldiers follow? Economic integration and regional security in the Southern Cone" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*; Beverly Hills; Spring 2000: 57.

⁸³ Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Transition and Civil-Military Relations in Chile: Contributions in a New International Framework" in *International Security & Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 88.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 89

⁸⁵ Pascale Bonnefoy, "Defying Critics, Chile to Buy F-16s," *Washington Post*, 31 January 2001, p. A21.

Neither diplomatic reinsertion nor the resolution of border disputes required increased participation in peacekeeping for Chile. Instead, it relied on traditional civilian diplomatic means to achieve their goals. In the end, Chilean foreign policy has not need to stress international peacekeeping as a major part of its overall efforts.

F. ECONOMIC POLICY

Chile's economic policy benefits from its traditional diplomatic prestige and is bolstered by its successful economic performance. Spearheaded by a multilateral economic integration strategy, Chile's economic policy has obviated the need for large-scale proactive participation in international peacekeeping as a way to enter the international system, in the way that Argentina has. Particularly the fact that Chile was not economically beholden to any one nation or region allowed them to carry out a more independent foreign policy, unlike Argentina which felt more dependent on gaining favor with the United States for its international status.

The main priority of Chile's economic policy during the since the Pinochet era has been international reinsertion through economic means. In the case of Chile, this meant not putting all its economic hopes in one particular region but to undertake a strategy of economic integration with many different partners. Geographically Chile is part of South America, but due to its long Pacific coastline, it is also a part of the Pacific Basin. This fact has not been lost on Chilean decision makers who have opened up their economy as much to Asian nations, as to nations of the Western Hemisphere. It is important to note that this multilateral approach to trade began in the 1970's during the Pinochet era, even though formal membership in trade organizations occurred in the 1990's.

The first step in Chile's international economic integration process actually happened with Asia as Japan replaced the United States as Chile's largest customer by 1991 and Chile became a member of the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in November 1994.⁸⁶ Then, in 1996 Chile became an associate member of the Southern

⁸⁶ Peter H. Smith, "Strategic Options for Latin America," in *Latin America in the New International System*, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin & Ralph H. Espach (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 40.

Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). In that same year, they reached a framework agreement for economic matters with the European Union. Additionally, not to leave out the world's largest economy from their economic strategy, in the early 1990's Chile began negotiations with the United States, Canada, and Mexico for membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, plans for NAFTA membership were indefinitely placed on hold when President Clinton was unable to obtain "fast-track" negotiation authority from the U.S. Congress.⁸⁷

G. MILITARY BUDGET AND MISSIONS

As noted above, the Chilean military enjoys a great degree of economic autonomy as a result of its constitutional guarantees: the military budget can not fall to below 1989 levels and it is guaranteed 10 per cent of copper exports. Although the importance of these prerogatives may be minimized with time, for now they continue to give the military a buffer from excessive civilian intrusion in defense matters. Some authors argue that this is not the case. Wendy Hunter claims that the decline of the defense budget relative to GDP since the end of the Pinochet era (2.96% of GDP in 1989 to 1.65% of GDP in 1996) is an indication of civilian contestation of military prerogatives.⁸⁸ However, the decline of the budget relative to GDP is misleading, and is more a result of Chile's successful economic performance than civilian contestation. In fact, in absolute terms, the budget has increased from US\$1.047 million in 1989 to US\$1.220 million in 1997.⁸⁹ With its continued economic autonomy, the Chilean military has not seen itself pressured to participate in international peacekeeping as a way to bolster its budget.

In terms of military roles and missions, the military has focused on traditional defense of its borders from external aggression. The military's training and modernization effort continues to move in this direction. In addition to external defense, the military also plays a secondary role in internal development.

⁸⁷ Ibid. 45.

⁸⁸ Wendy Hunter, "Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 112, Nr. 3 (1997), pp. 453-475.

⁸⁹ Ruth Stanley, "Modes of Transition v. Electoral Dynamics: Democratic Control of the Military in Argentina and Chile," *Journal of Third World Studies*, (Americus, Fall 2001) pp. 71-91

As noted above, in spite of a decrease in border tensions since the end of the Cold War and the overall lack of external security threats, the Chilean military has held on to a policy emphasizing the defense of the nation from external aggression. The best example of how Chile continues to focus on traditional threats is its military modernization plan. Each service has a plan to modernize that includes almost exclusively modern military hardware. According to Chile's defense minister, Mario Fernandez, Chile needs to be prepared for international peacekeeping, fisheries protection, and drug trafficking, however Chile's modernization plans do not match this statement.⁹⁰ The air force will be receiving new F-16 fighters from the United States, the navy plans to purchase four German frigates, and the army's modernization plans focus on improving their electronic warfare capabilities, specifically anti-air and anti-armor defense. Accordingly, training continues to follow traditional roles, as evidenced by the curriculum at the *Centro de Entrenamiento Operativo y Táctico*, the army's new training center.⁹¹

Although the military has emphasized external defense roles, there is a tradition in Chile of an internal development role for the armed forces, and this role is growing slightly. Although not as large as Brazil's project in the Amazons, the Chilean military has pursued a project called *Fronteras Interiores* (Interior Borders), focused on territorial occupation of the extreme north, south and east and the national integration and economic modernization of these otherwise desolate territories.⁹²

Peacekeeping then holds only a minor role for the Chilean military. As evidenced by its aggressive modernization plan, even against public opinion and the wishes of many politicians, Chile's military continues to have a large say in their roles and missions⁹³. Unlike Argentina, they have not been forced into accepting peacekeeping as a major role for the military.

⁹⁰ "The Americas: Retooling Chile's defence policy," *The Economist*, (London, 18 August, 2001), pp. 26-27

⁹¹ Wendy Hunter, *State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the military's role in Argentina, Brazil and Chile* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Bonnefoy

H. CONCLUSION

Of the three nations in this study, the Chilean military has maintained the highest degree of autonomy in the democratic era. In addition, the Chilean armed forces have held on to the traditional doctrine of territorial defense. As a result the Chilean military was relatively absent from most UN military operations during the 1990's. While it appears that even Chilean civilian leadership is reluctant to become greatly involved in peacekeeping missions, it appears that it is the military's influence that is the greatest factor in Chile's lack of peacekeeping participation.

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V. REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Thus far, the analysis has shown that each country in this study has demonstrated a different pattern concerning international peacekeeping. Argentina participates extensively in international peacekeeping operations. For their part, Brazil operates in peacekeeping missions at a moderately high level, though less than Argentina. Finally, Chile's involvement in international peacekeeping has been relatively low. Given these patterns in international peacekeeping, is it safe to assume that these nations would follow the same path regarding regional peacekeeping? This chapter reviews the factors earlier identified as crucial for regional peacekeeping decisions, namely, operational funding, the presence of a regional hegemon, and the higher stakes involved in regional versus international peacekeeping.

A. OPERATIONAL FUNDING

One of the main critiques of regional peacekeeping is the general lack of operational capability of regional organization to conduct peacekeeping operations.⁹⁴ The Organization of American States (OAS), the major regional organization within Latin America, is no exception in this regard. Although the OAS charter has provisions for the pacific settlement of dispute, and conflict resolution in chapters V and VI, respectively, there is no specific mention of peacekeeping. Without a specific provision for peacekeeping operations, the capability to conduct and fund these operations is hampered. While the OAS has conducted different types of peacekeeping operations, from the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic in 1965, to its role in the Central American peace process in the 1980's and 1990's, these operations have always depended on funding from one or more of the participants. The IAPF was heavily funded by the United States, for example. There is no reason to believe that the OAS will attempt to change the process for funding peacekeeping in the future.

With the lack of operational funding ability of the OAS any future peacekeeping operation in Latin America would likely depend on financial contributions from its

⁹⁴ John S. Clark, *Keeping the Peace: Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping*, (Montgomery, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, 1996).

members. Looking specifically at the three nations in this study there would be varying degrees of willingness or ability to provide funding for such an operation.

In the case of Argentina, particularly in the midst of the economic crisis of 2001-2002, it would be hard pressed to join any operation in which it would be required to provide a great degree of funding. As discussed in chapter II, one of the motivating factors in Argentina's increase in peacekeeping participation were the perceived economic incentives. Chile, on the other hand, may have the financial capability to fund its own part of a peacekeeping operation, but with its reluctance to become heavily involved in peacekeeping, it is less likely they will have the political will to take part. Of the three nations, Brazil is the most likely to have both the political will and financial capability to engage in a regional peacekeeping operation.

B. REGIONAL HEGEMON

There is arguably no other region in the world that has to contend as much with a regional hegemon as the members of the Western Hemisphere. With the most powerful nation in the world, the United States, in their own back yard, the nations of Latin America are always mindful of the actions of the giant to the North. For example, Latin American countries were reluctant to use the OAS for peacekeeping in Central America in the late 1980's because they felt the United States had too much influence in the organization.⁹⁵ As addressed earlier, Brazil is the most likely Southern Cone nation to successfully confront the United States and to act independently of US policy. This would most likely be true in a future Latin American regional peacekeeping mission as well. Chile would be the second most likely to maintain a policy independent of the United States, as evidenced by their resistance to US pressure to increase peacekeeping participation. Finally, Argentina, especially with their current economic crisis, would be the least likely of the countries to challenge the regional hegemon.

C. HIGHER STAKES OF THE PARTICIPANT NATIONS

The fact that nations have a greater interest in affairs within their region is no surprise. This is particularly true today when economic interests are often tied up in

⁹⁵ Walter Dorn, "Regional Peacekeeping is Not the Way," *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 27, no. 2, (1998) p. 1.

regional blocs such as Mercosur. The greater the degree of economic integration in a region, the greater the stakes will be in taking part in a peacekeeping operation. In the case of Latin America, the move towards a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas will further link the nations of the region. In addition to the economic interests that a nation may have in a target country, an important consideration of decision makers, particularly democratic ones, is the importance of public opinion, which may increase in the case of a regional peacekeeping where troops are sent into neighboring countries rather than far away regions.

D. CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

1. Argentina

It is clear that of the three countries examined in this thesis, Argentina has been the most active in peacekeeping operations. However, this high level of activity does not readily predict whether Argentina would take part in a peacekeeping operation in Latin America. As evidenced in the data one of Argentina's biggest motivators for peacekeeping has been establishing a positive international image in order to extract concrete gains from the international community. Primary among the countries that Argentina has attempted to curry favor with is the United States. Additionally, Argentina has used peacekeeping as a way of gaining concrete financial rewards. Regional peacekeeping is not likely to afford Argentina the international exposure, nor the financial rewards it has enjoyed with international peacekeeping. For this reason Argentine contributions to a regional peacekeeping operation would not likely be as generous as with international peacekeeping. An additional factor likely to affect Argentina's participation in future peacekeeping in the region is the economic crisis that the country is experiencing as of the beginning of 2002. Unless it can rebound from this major crisis, chances of Argentina playing a large role in a regional peacekeeping operation are minimal, particularly if the burden of funding fell on Argentina itself.

2. Brazil

Although Brazil has not been as aggressive in sending troops to peacekeeping operations as Argentina, it has done its fair share of international peacekeeping. As evidenced by Brazil's history of participation in UN and other peacekeeping operations,

it is clear that Brazil has the will and the ability to participate and lead global peacekeeping operations. With a great degree of experience in peacekeeping operations, and the largest military in Latin America, Brazil could potentially lead a major peacekeeping operation in the region. One of the aspects that stands out when discussing Brazilian peacekeeping has been the propensity for the Brazilians to fill positions of leadership in these operations. One of the reasons Brazil may be reluctant to take part in regional peacekeeping is its adherence to a principle of non-intervention in the Western Hemisphere. This is particularly true if the US is somehow involved in the operation. On the other hand, Brazil does aspire to be a leader in Latin America and non-involvement in an operation supported by most Latin American nations might work against this aspiration. In the end, the likelihood of Brazilian participation would be increased if it were guaranteed a position of leadership in the operation. One of the recent successes of regional peacekeeping, MOMEPA had a Brazilian general as mission commander, as did the IAFM mission in the Dominican Republic in 1965. US decision makers would be wise to consider Brazil's aspiration for leadership when formulating a regional peacekeeping plan in Latin America.

3. Chile

Chile's potential for being a leader in peacekeeping operations in Latin America is hampered by its traditional national defense policy, (promoted by an autonomous military) and its strict interpretation of peacekeeping operations. First of all the operation would have to clearly fall under peacekeeping as defined by Chapter 6 of the UN charter in order to be considered. Furthermore, assuming the operation is deemed worthy of participation, it would most likely not involve a large contingent of troops, in keeping with Chilean peacekeeping policy. Based on the above criteria it seems unlikely that Chile would be a major contributor to a peacekeeping operation in its own region.

4. Conclusion

After reviewing the available data it seems clear that Brazil, and not Argentina, is the best candidate to lead and provide funding for a regional peacekeeping operation in Latin America. Although the balance of power between civilian and military leaders in Brazil remains ambiguous, it appears that peacekeeping provides enough incentive to

both sides to make it a viable secondary mission. Additionally, although peacekeeping is not viewed as the major foreign policy strategy, it does meet the needs of the foreign policy makers in terms of providing Brazil a platform for showcasing its leadership ability. As for the funding of a regional operation, Brazil's military budget is relatively healthy as is its overall economy, making it able, at least for a limited time to fund its portion of a peacekeeping operation. Finally, it is the nation in the best position to act independently of US policy, which would help that a future regional operation is not unduly influenced by the regional hegemon.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US POLICY

In the case of a regional peacekeeping operation in Latin America, the participation of countries from within the region would ease the peacekeeping burden of the United States. It is in the best interest of the United States to encourage the participation of Latin American countries, and due to the importance of the Southern Cone, these countries require particular attention from policy makers. The conclusions of this study result in several implications for US policy makers. These implications are as follows: 1) a regional peacekeeping operation would require heavy funding from either the United States or the UN, 2) the United States must consider its position as the regional hegemon when dealing with Southern Cone countries, and 3) the United States must emphasize the high stakes involved in maintaining regional stability.

As stated above, the OAS does not have any procedures in place to fund peacekeeping operations. Additionally, of the Southern Cone nations only Brazil is likely to have the political will and ability to provide funding for a regional operation. Argentina is in no position to fund any additional military ventures and although Chile may be able to do so, its political will is questionable. With this in mind, it is likely that the United States would be expected to provide a large portion of the funding, if not personnel, for a regional peacekeeping operation.

Another important consideration for the United States is its position as the regional hegemon. The United States can often use its political might to get other countries to accept its policies, however this may not always be the case in the Southern Cone. Rather, United States policy makers should be aware of the potential drawbacks of

assuming the posture of the regional hegemon. Brazil in particular is very sensitive to United States involvement in Latin American affairs and as stated earlier, may be more easily convinced to share the burden in peacekeeping, if it is given a share of the leadership. Chile too has at times non-concurred with US policy. American policy makers would get the most out of Brazil and Chile by treating them as equals. Of the three countries, Argentina is the least likely to oppose US hegemony in the region. As demonstrated, Argentina has already demonstrated a pattern of alignment with the United States and the current economic crisis is likely to reinforce this pattern.

Finally, the best chance for the United States in garnering support for Southern Cone participation in regional peacekeeping is by emphasizing the high stakes each country has in such an operation. With greater economic integration of the region, countries will have a high interest in maintaining regional stability. The United States should reinforce the fact that instability in one country in the region will have repercussions in all other countries, and therefore it is vital for Southern Cone countries to do their part in a regional peacekeeping operation.

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